Inhabitants of a single-family home hold out as the Yuzhnoye Butovo (Южное Бутово) district is built on annexed land to the south of Moscow in 2006. Source: Московские Новости

"We Will Cultivate Our Own Club," a poster of neighbors landscaping the yard of their housing complex, by M. Belov and A. Savin. Source: IRI 1991

Cover and opening page of the book Housing Construction: Planning of Workers' Dwellings, by Georgy Volfenzon. Source: Вольфензон 1927
Moscow and Russian attitudes toward economic reform, November-December 1993 (percent)

Source: Russian Election Project, funded by the Carnegie Corporation, the MacArthur Foundation and the National Science Foundation, organized by Timothy Colton, Jerry Hough and Susan Lehmann (via Colton 1995: 703)

Building density in the City of Moscow (according to data from the Bureau of Technical Inventory as of June 1, 2011). Source: Departament Gradostroitel'noy Politiki Goroda Moskvy (DGPGM) 2011


"When the economists say that present-day relations — the relations of bourgeois production — are natural, they imply that these are the relations in which wealth is created and productive forces developed in conformity with the laws of nature. These relations therefore are themselves natural laws independent of the influence of time. They are eternal laws which must always govern society. Thus, there has been history, but there is no longer any. There has been history, since there were the institutions of feudalism, and in these institutions of feudalism we find quite different relations of production from those of bourgeois society, which the economists try to pass off as natural and as such, eternal." - Marx 1955 [1847]: 54

"Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted." - Marx 1973 [1852]: 146 (via Balibar 2007 [1993]: 4, "Sartre, among others, considered [this statement] the central thesis of historical materialism")

"So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being. [163] ...

"By 'Others' we do not mean everyone else but me — those over against whom the 'I' stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself — those among whom one is too. ... By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. [154-5] ...

"Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' — of the "they" as an essential existentiale. [168]" - Heidegger 2001 [1926]

"Gathering or assembly, by an ancient word of our language, is called 'thing.'" - Heidegger 2001 [1951]: 151

"Marx actually took a firm position against a philosophical materialism which was current among many of the most progressive thinkers (especially natural scientists) of his time. This materialism claimed that 'the' substratum of all mental and spiritual phenomena was to be found in matter and material processes. ... Marx fought this type of mechanical, 'bourgeois' materialism 'the abstract materialism of natural science, that excludes history and its process,' [Marx 1971] and postulated instead what he called in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 'naturalism or humanism [which] is distinguished from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time constitutes their unifying truth.' [Marx 1982] In fact, Marx never used the terms 'historical materialism' or 'dialectic materialism'; he did speak of his own 'dialectical method' in contrast with that of Hegel and of its 'materialistic basis,' by which he simply referred to the fundamental conditions of human existence.

"This aspect of 'materialism,' Marx's 'materialist method,' which distinguishes his view from that of Hegel, involves the study of the real economic and social life of man and of the influence of man's actual way of life on this thinking and feeling." - Erich Fromm 1961: 8-9

"When [Theodor] Adorno criticized [Walter] Benjamin's 'wide-eyed presentation of actualities' (Briefe II, 793), he hit the nail right on its head; this is precisely what Benjamin was doing and wanted to do. Strongly influenced by surrealism, it was the 'attempt to capture the portrait of history in the most insignificant representations of reality, its scraps, as it were' (Briefe II, 685). [11] ...

"How remote these studies were from Marxism and dialectical materialism is confirmed by their central figure, the flâneur. It is to him, aimlessly strolling through the crowds in the big cities in studied contrast to their hurried, purposeful activity, that things reveal themselves in their secret meaning: 'The true picture of the past flits by' ('Philosophy of History'), and only the flâneur who idly strolls by receives the message. With great acumen Adorno has pointed to the static element in Benjamin: 'To understand Benjamin properly one must feel behind his every sentence the conversion of extreme agitation into something static, indeed, the static notion of movement itself' (Schriften I, xix). Naturally, nothing could be more 'undialectic' than this attitude in which the 'angel of history' (in the ninth of the 'Theses on the Philosophy of History') does not dialectically move forward into the future, but has his face 'turned toward the past.' ... For just as the flâneur, through the gestus of purposeless strolling, turns his back to the crowd even as he is propelled and swept by it, so the 'angel of history,' who looks at nothing but the expanse of ruins of the past, is blown backwards into the future by the storm of progress. That such thinking should ever have bothered with a consistent, dialectically sensible, rationally explainable process seems absurd. ...

"In his concern with directly, actually demonstrable concrete facts, with single events and occurrences whose 'significance' is manifest, Benjamin was not much interested in theories or 'ideas' which did not immediately assume the most precise outward shape imaginable. To this very complex but still highly realistic mode of thought the Marxian relationship between superstructure and substructure became, in a precise sense, a metaphorical one. [12-13] ...

"He had no trouble understanding the theory of the superstructure as the final doctrine of metaphorical thinking — precisely because without much ado and eschewing all 'mediations' he directly related the superstructure to the so-called 'material' substructure, which to him meant the totality of sensually experienced data. ...

"It seems plausible that Benjamin, whose spiritual existence had been formed and informed by Goethe, a poet and not a philosopher, and whose interest was almost exclusively aroused by poets and novelists, although he had studied philosophy, should have found it easier to communicate with poets than with theoreticians, whether of the dialectical or the metaphysical variety. [14] ...

"Adorno and [Gershom] Scholem blamed Brecht's 'disastrous influence' (Scholem) for Benjamin's clearly undialectic usage of Marxian categories and his determined break with all metaphysics. [15]" - Arendt 2007 [1968]

"A truly radical geography is merely one important perspective within the practice of a unified field of activity: historical materialism. ... Both Marxism and cultural geography commence at the same ontological point. In strict opposition to any form of determinism or linear causal explanation they insist on characterising the relationship between humans and nature as historical ... men and women make their history and themselves ..." - Cosgrove 1983: 1

"In place of 'force' we may talk of 'weaknesses', 'entelechies', 'monads', or more simply 'actants.' [159] ... An actant can gain strength only by associating with others. [160] ... Nothing is by itself ordered or disordered, unique or multiple, homogeneous or heterogeneous, fluid or inert, human or inhuman, useful or useless. Never by itself, but always by others. [161] ... Some believe themselves to be the molds while others are the raw material, but this is a form of elitism. In order to enroll a force we must conspire with it. ... The words 'necessary' or 'contingent' gain meaning only when they are used in the heat of the moment to describe gradients of resistance — that is, reality. ... Circumstances determine, for a time, the relative importance of whatever it is that makes them up. [161] ... Nothing is, by itself, the same as or different from anything else. That is, there are no equivalents, only translations. In other words, everything happens only once, and at one place. If there are identities between actants, this is because they have been constructed at great expense. If there are equivalences, this is because they have been built out of bits and pieces with much toil and sweat, and because they are maintained by force. If there are exchanges, these are always unequal and cost a fortune both to establish and to maintain. ... [T]he best that can be done between actants is to translate the one into the other. [162] ... 'Nothing can be reduced to anything else, nothing can be deduced from anything else, everything may be allied to everything else.'" [163] - Latour 1988

"Is not the force that comes from outside a certain idea of Life, a certain vitalism, in which Foucault's thought culminates? Is not life this capacity to resist force?" - Deleuze 1988: 93

"The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics." - Haraway 1991: 150 (via Castree 2002: 162)

"[T]he modern critique did not simply turn to Nature in order to destroy human prejudices. It soon began to move in the other direction, turning to the newly founded social sciences in order to destroy the excesses of naturalization. This was the second Enlightenment, that of the nineteenth century. This time, precise knowledge of society and its laws made it possible to criticize not only the biases of ordinary obscurantism but also the new biases created by the natural sciences. ... [A] succession of radical revolutions created an obscure 'yesteryear' that was soon to be dissipated by the luminous dawn of the social sciences. The traps of naturalization and scientific ideology were finally dispelled. No one who has not waited for that dawn and thrilled to its promises is modern.

The invincible moderns even found themselves able to combine the two critical moves by using the natural sciences to debunk the false pretensions of power and using the certainties of the human sciences to uncover the false pretensions of the natural sciences, and of scientism. Total knowledge was finally within reach. If it seemed impossible, for so long, to get past Marxism, this was because Marxism interwove the two most powerful resources ever developed for the modern critique, and bound them together for all time (Althusser, 1992) . Marxism made it possible to retain the portion of truth belonging to the natural and social sciences even while it carefully eliminated their condemned portion, their ideology. Marxism realized — and finished off, as was soon to become clear — all the hopes of the first Enlightenment, along with all those of the second. The first distinction between material causality and the illusions of obscurantism, like the second distinction between science and ideology, still remain the two principal sources of modern indignation today, even though our contemporaries can no longer close off discussion in Marxist fashion, and even though their critical capital has now been disseminated into the hands of millions of small shareholders. Anyone who has never felt this dual power vibrate within, anyone who has never been obsessed by the distinction between rationality and obscurantism, between false ideology and true science, has never been modern.

Solidly grounded in the transcendental certainty of nature's laws, the modern man or woman can criticize and unveil, denounce and express indignation at irrational beliefs and unjustified dominations. Solidly grounded in the certainty that humans make their own destiny, the modern man or woman can criticize and unveil, express indignation at and denounce irrational beliefs, the biases of ideologies, and the unjustified domination of the experts who claim to have staked out the limits of action and freedom. The exclusive transcendence of a Nature that is our doing, and the exclusive immanence of a Society that we create through and through, would nevertheless paralyze the moderns, who would appear too impotent in the face of things and too powerful within society. What an enormous advantage to be able to reverse the principles without even the appearance of contradiction! In spite of its transcendence, Nature remains mobilizable, humanizable, socializable. Every day, laboratories, collections, centres of calculation and of profit, research bureaus and scientific institutions blend it with the multiple destinies of social groups. Conversely, even though we construct Society through and through, it lasts, it surpasses us, it dominates us, it has its own laws, it is as transcendent as Nature. For every day, laboratories, collections, centres of calculation and of profit, research bureaus and scientific institutions stake out the limits to the freedom of social groups, and transform human relations into durable objects that no one has made. The critical power of the moderns lies in this double language: they can mobilize Nature at the heart of social relationships, even as they leave Nature infinitely remote from human beings; they are free to make and unmake their society, even as they render its laws ineluctable, necessary and absolute. - Latour 1993 [1991]: 36-7

"Whatever that mysterious organizing principle called 'life' may be, its immediate source is clearly the Ecosphere. Ecology demonstrates that organisms and their earthly matrices are symbiotic and inseparable, differentiated only by our cheating sense of sight. A creative animating process, life is an expression of the blue planet and its 4.6 billion years of evolution. The biological fallacy — equating organisms with life — is the result of a faulty inside-the-system view. ... The idea that vitality characterizes the Ecosphere, rather than just its organic parts, illuminates many bright ideas that the lack of reasonable context has dulled — Gregory Bateson's universal pattern that connects all things, Rupert Sheldrake's morphogenetic fields that guide organic development — because the Ecosphere is an organizing entity. It is not a superorganism; it is supraorganic: a higher level of organization than plants and animals, including people. The lively Ecosphere gives the lie to those who see the world's reality as little more than a competitive arena, for without compliant cooperation among its multitudinous parts the diversifying creativity of the planet could not have evolved nor could its overall homeostasis continue." - Rowe 1992: 394

"If the old Constitution required a constant classification of the provisional results of history in the two opposite compartments of ontology or politics, the same is not true of the new Constitution. [From the glossary. p. 239: "Constitution: Term borrowed from law and political science, used here in a broader metaphysical sense, since it refers to the division of beings into humans and nonhumans, objects and subjects, and to the type of power and ability to speak, mandate, and will that they receive. Unlike the term 'culture,' 'Constitution' refers to things as well as to persons; unlike the term 'structure,' it points to the willful, explicit, spelled-out character of this apportionment. ... I set the 'old' modern Constitution in opposition to the 'new' Constitution of political ecology ..."] ... Nature changed metaphysics without anyone's ever understanding what sleight of hand brought this about, since it was supposed to remain, as the name indicates, anterior to any metaphysics. The same is not true of the new Constitution, which has precisely the goal of following in detail the intermediary degrees between what is and what ought to be, registering all the successive stages of what I have called an experimental metaphysics*. [* From the glossary, p. 242: "I call experimental metaphysics the search for what makes up the common world, and I reserve the deliberately paradoxical expression 'metaphysics of nature' for the traditional solution that gave nature a political role."] The old system allowed shortcuts and acceleration, but it did not understand dynamics, whereas ours, which aims at slowing things down and fosters a great respect for procedures, does allow an understanding of movement and process." - Latour 2004 [1999]: 123

"A thoroughgoing ecological analysis requires a standpoint that is both materialist and dialectical. As opposed to a spiritualistic, vitalistic view of the natural world which tends to see it as conforming to some teleological purpose, a materialist sees evolution as an open-ended process of natural history, governed by contingency, but open to rational explanation. A materialist viewpoint that is also dialectical in nature (that is, a non mechanistic materialism) sees this as a process of transmutation of forms in a context of interrelatedness that excludes all absolute distinctions. ... A dialectical approach forces us to recognize that organisms in general do not simply adapt to their environment; they also affect that environment in various ways by affecting change in it. The relationship is therefor reciprocal." - Foster 2000: 15-6, via Swyngedouw 2006: 25

"Politics is inseparable from ontology. Every ontology is political and every politics is itself an ontology. The reciprocal relation between ontology and politics can be identified as the question of their 'parallelism'. This parallelism of the ontological and the political is first to be found in Spinoza's thought. Spinoza can only write an ethics and a politics on the basis of his analysis of substance. In this analysis the thesis of 'parallelism' occupies a central position such that his theory of the univocity of being itself rests on this principle. This project of the affirmation of pure immanence is rehabilitated within contemporary thought by Deleuze-Guattari in their own philosophy as a form of radical materialism. Appeals to transcendence are nothing but vestiges of theological reasoning. I will refer to this form of philosophy, guided by the principle of 'parallelism', as ontological materialism. This thought does not stand outside classical ontology but is an offshoot of the ontological tradition itself. Insofar as it belongs to this tradition, it manifests certain specific traits: every materialist ontology denies any pre-constituted structure of being or any teleological order of existence and instead unfolds within a strictly immanent discourse in which only a constitutive conception of practice can serve as foundation. Underlying it is the philosophical insight that a properly thought-out politics requires an ontology. Without ontology politics is merely ideology." - Boyer 2001: 174-5

"[According to David Harvey (1996: 49, 140)] the social and the natural, the local and the global are internally related as particular 'moments' within processes that dissolve ontological divides." - Castree 2002: 128

"Continental philosophy is riven by great divide. One tradition, whose foremost representative is Jürgen Habermas, seeks to complete the unfinished project of modernity, based on the concept of reason that it has enshrined. The other tradition, among whose foremost representatives are Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault, wants — according to Habermas himself — "to advance Nietzsche's program of a critique of reason," in the case of Heidegger through a destruction of metaphysics, in the case of Foucault through а destruction of historiography." - Milchman and Rosenberg 2003: 1

"[F]or Foucault, like Heidegger, the key is savoir, or ontological knowledge. What is important is that for Foucault this ontological investigation is historical — it thereby refuses to set universal conditions — something that Heidegger only does in his later works." - Elden 2003: 197

"In later works, beginning from around the mid-1930s, Heidegger starts to redress the balance and to treat questions of spatiality as equally important to those of temporality. The principal thrust of his argument is that space, like time, has been understood in a narrow, calculative, mathematical sense, which is divorced from our experience of space in our everyday dealings with the world. In the case of space, Descartes' understanding of res extensa is the central ontological break. Descartes' distinction between res cogitans and res extensa means that the fundamental ontological determination of substance, material being, is that it is extended in three dimensions. ... Heidegger takes issue with such a reductive analysis. Instead, he suggests that we deal with the world as a matter of concern, acting with and reacting to objects within it in a lived, experiential way, instead of abstracting from them in a Cartesian grid of coordinates. ... Technology, taking the world as a substance which can be ordered, planned, and worked upon — instead of worked with — is a direct consequence of Cartesian metaphysics, and is the condition of possibility for modern science, mechanised forms of agriculture, the holocaust, nuclear weapons and other modern forms of control. Heidegger’s critique of Nazism, such that it is, is principally grounded upon it being a continuation of, instead of a challenge to, this metaphysical understanding of the world (see Heidegger 1977; Elden 2003)." - Elden 2004a: 92-3 (see also Elden 2004b: 188)

"The molecular strategies of capital as mobilised by a myriad of atomistic actors produce rhizomatic geographical mappings that consist of complex combinations and layers of nodes and linkages, which are interconnected in proliferating networks and flows of money, information, commodities and people. The flows that shape and define these networks are of course local at every moment (Latour 1993)." - Swyngedouw 2004: 31

"If hierarchies vanish today in our academic theories, then so too vanish most of the targets of our political critique. One can't fight what one can't see or identify. - Smith 2005: 897

"Time here [in the Beiträge, Heidegger 1989] is the possible truth for being (and the nonmetaphysical beyng at that), but it must be thought in relation to space in this regard, unlike in Being and Time when temporality was the guiding clue for the question of being ... . Indeed, Heidegger's suggestion is more than time-space needing to be thought together, instead of apart. Time-space is not simply the coupling of time and space, but the very notion that allows each to be thought distinctly. Zeit-Raum is not the same as Zeitraum — that is, a span of time, a notion that betrays a measured, mathematical sense. Thinking the idea of time (the Wesen, the essence of time), forces us — through the notion of the Da, the there or the here of being, being-the-there — to come to terms with space. The reverse is also the case. ... Time-space takes on a particularly privileged role in the Beiträge, as 'originally the site for the moment of propriation [Augenblicks-Stätte des Ereignisses]' (1989, page 30, see also page 235). ... [T]his is the way to understand the notion of Da-sein, as 'the site for the moment of the grounding of the truth of beyng' (page 323, see also pages 374-375). [820-1] ...

"It should of course be mentioned that we cannot simply try to return to the origin, a way of thinking before the metaphysical fall. We cannot simply turn back metaphysics. Rather, we need to think historically about the problem, and retrace the 'descent out of the history [die Herkunft aus der Geschichte]' (page 372) ... [822]" - Elden 2005a

"The English word assemblage is gaining currency in the humanities and social sciences as a concept of knowledge, but its uses remain disparate and sometimes imprecise. Two factors contribute to the situation. First, the concept is normally understood to be derived from the French word agencement, as used in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (who, furthermore, do not use the French word assemblage in this way). Tracing the concept in its philosophical sense back to their texts, one discovers that it cannot easily be understood except in connection with the development of a complex of such concepts. Agencement implies specific connections with the other concepts. It is, in fact, the arrangement of these connections that gives the concepts their sense. For Deleuze and Guattari, a philosophical concept never operates in isolation but comes to its sense in connection with other senses in specific yet creative and often unpredictable ways. This in connection with already provides something of the sense of agencement, if one accepts that a concept arises in philosophy as the connection between a state of affairs and the statements we can make about it. Agencement designates the priority of neither the state of affairs nor the statement but of their connection, which implies the production of a sense that exceeds them and of which, transformed, they now form parts.

"Secondly, the translation of agencement by assemblage can give rise to connotations based on analogical impressions, which liberate elements of a vocabulary from the arguments that once helped form it. One of the earliest attempts to translate Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term agencement appears in the first published translation, by Paul Foss and Paul Patton in 1981, of the article 'Rhizome'. The English term they use, assemblage, is retained in Brian Massumi’s later English version, when 'Rhizome' appears as the Introduction to A Thousand Plateaus. Since then many (though by no means all) translators and commentators have agreed, in a loose consensus, to keep to this early translation of agencement by assemblage, while acknowledging that the translation is not really a good approximation." - Phillips 2006: 108

"Metabolic circulation, then, is the socially mediated process of environmental, including technological, transformation and trans-configuration, through which all manner of “agents” are mobilized, attached, collectivized, and networked. The heterogeneous assemblages that emerge, as moments in the accelerating and intensifying circuitry of metabolic vehicles, are central to a historical-geographical materialist ontology ..." - Heynen et al. 2006: 32, see also 23-4

"For Marx, it is not a question of understanding how nature and society interact; rather the point is that nature is incomprehensible except as mediated by social labour, and consequently there has to be a rethinking that posits labour as central to nature. This flies directly in the face of either an external notion of nature, which excludes labour, or a universalist notion which broadly refuses labour as the nexus of society and nature.

"The notion of metabolism sets up the circulation of matter, value and representations as the vortex of social nature. But, as the original German term, 'Stoffwechsel', better suggests, this is not simply a repetitive process of circulation through already established pathways. Habitual circulation there certainly is, but no sense of long-term or even necessarily short-term equilibrium. Rather 'Stoffwechsel' expresses a sense of creativity in much the same way that Benjamin talks about mimesis: the metabolism of nature is always already a production of nature in which neither society nor nature can be stabilized with the fixity implied by their ideological separation. Society is forged in the crucible of nature’s metabolism, for sure, but nature is equally the amalgam of simmering social change." - Smith 2006: xiv

"Twentieth century biology (especially microbiology) was structure oriented, reductionist, and temporal in its view of life. The biology of today must be evolutionary, holistic, and process oriented.

"We meet 21st century biology right now in terms of two grand problems: 1) the evolution of the cell; and 2) an understanding of the global environment. While these two may seem quite unrelated, the one as fundamental as biology now gets, the other essentially applied (and of pressing concern), this is not so. At base both represent problems in biological organization. And the two will become closely joined when biology comes to study the early stages in the evolution of the cell, when horizontal gene transfer dominated the evolutionary dynamic, leading to an evolution that was essentially communal ..." - Woese 2007: 15

"For a short while, materialism seemed to be a foolproof appeal to a type of agency and a set of entities and forces that allowed analysts to explain, dismiss, or see through other types of agencies. Typically, for instance, it was possible to explain conceptual superstructures by means of material infrastructures. Thus an appeal to a sound, tablethumping materialism seemed an ideal way to shatter the pretensions of those who tried to hide their brutal interests behind notions like morality, culture, religion, politics, or art. But that’s precisely the point: it was an ideal and not a material way of making a point. Materialism, in the short period in which it could be used as a discussion-closing trope, implied what now appears in retrospect as a rather idealist definition of matter and its various agencies. I am not enough of a historian to put dates on this short period where the materialistic explanans had its greatest force, but it might not be totally off the mark to say that it persisted from the era of post-Marxism (Marx’s own definition of material explanation being infinitely more subtle than what his successors made of it) all the way to the end-of-the-century sociobiologists (who tried without much success to insert their own simplistic mechanisms into the glorious lineage of Darwin)." - Latour 2007: 135

"The ontologisation of theory in human geography marks a distinctive inflection of a broad array of post-foundationalist philosophies. Post-foundational philosophies hold that the world of human affairs is not only held together by relationships of knowledge, and where it is, knowledge is not a matter of certainty ... . They promise to deflate approaches that prioritise the epistemological aspects of action, and which assume that non-cognitive grounds of action and belief are suspect. The resurgent theme of affect in the social sciences and the humanities is illustrative of this post-foundational deflation of overly cognitivist models of action. ...

"Thrift's work [2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007] has explicitly set out to invent a field of 'nonrepresentational theory' in which affect is ascribed considerable significance as both an object of analysis and as a theoretical orientation. ... Affect is presented as an ontological layer of embodied existence, delimited by reference to the purely formal relationship of the capacity to be affected and to affect. In this presentation, affect is doubly located: in the relational in-between of fields of interaction; and layered below the level of minded, intentional consciousness. This vocabulary of the 'layering' of thinking, feeling and judgement is fundamental to the political resonances claimed on behalf of ontologies of affect. [187-8] ...

"This is ambivalence between claiming that any and all subjective apprehension of the self relies on a background of affective dispositions, and a politically inflected claim that the manipulation of these background conditions in particular situations carries with it a normatively charged threat of harm or injustice, in the form of involuntary submission to the will of others. What remains unexplored is how and when one might tell the difference between these two aspects of life, or even what reconfigured understanding of criteria might help in this task. [198]" - Barnett 2008

"[M]aterialism hardly represents an advance over idealism if it is only able to account for meaning by postulating an originary principle of intelligibility in matter. Thus it is not only meaning's emergence from meaninglessness that must be accounted for; it is also the emergence of the intelligible from the sensible. The first is an ontological problem about what meaning is; the second is an epistemological problem about how intelligibility is possible in a world whose structure does not depend upon thought. It is imperative not to elide these two, on pain of mystifying both the nature of meaning and that of thought." - Brassier 2008: 2

"Latour grants no initial principle of endurance over time, just as he accepts no force of temporal flux over and above specific actors themselves. Latour is no philosopher of becoming, no 'process philosopher' except in the trivial sense that he tries to account for changes in the world, as every thinker must. As we have seen, Latour goes so far as to claim that time is produced by the labour of actors, and that only such actors create an asymmetry of before and after. For exactly the same reason, the links between one instant and another must also be produced through the labour of actants, for they are not pre-given in some sort of internal drive or conatus in the heart of things that would free them from the prison of single instants. After all, the utter concreteness of actants actually requires that they be incarcerated in an instant. More occasionalist than Bergsonian, Latour's actors have no choice but to occupy punctiform cinematic frames." - Harmon 2009: 105

"Spinoza stands as a touchstone for me in this book, even though he himself was not quite a materialist. I invoke his idea of conative bodies that strive to enhance their power of activity by forming alliances with other bodies, and I share his faith that everything is made of the same substance. Spinoza rejected the idea that man 'disturbs rather than follows Nature's order,' and promises instead to 'consider human actions and appetites just as if it were an investigation into lines, planes, or bodies.' [x] ...

"I pursue a materialism in the tradition of Democritus-Epicurus-Spinoza-Diderot-Deleuze more than Hegel-Marx-Auorno. It is important to follow the trail of human power to expose social hegemonies (as historical materialists do). But my contention is that there is also public value in following the scent of a nonhuman, thingly power, the material agency of natural bodies and technological artifacts. [xiii] ...

"Because politics is itself often construed as an exclusively human domain, what registers on it is a set of material constraints on or a context for human action. Dogged resistance to anthropocentrism is perhaps the main difference between the vital materialism I pursue and this kind of historical materialism. I will emphasize, even overemphasize, the agentic contributions of nonhuman forces (operating in nature, in the human body, and in human artifacts) in an attempt to counter the narcissistic reflex of human language and thought. [xvi]" - Bennett 2010

"Bennett [2010] uses materialism in a way that could easily apply both to object-oriented philosophy and to the closely related writings of Latour. She takes materialism to be a suitable name for any philosophy that dissolves the usual strict opposition between free human subjects and inert material slabs. Naturally, I am all in favor of this dissolution; I simply doubt that 'materialism' is the best name for it.

"In one sense, terminology is always somewhat arbitrary, and we should be free to coin and use it as we wish. But as a general rule, it seems best to avoid confusion by grounding terms in their tradition of historical use. What links Bennett's position most closely with Latour's and my own is that she opposes reduction as a general philosophical method: music and governments cannot be reduced to carbon, oxygen, metal, or some deeper alternative structure. Instead, all human and nonhuman things of every scale are placed on the same footing. By contrast with this position, materialism throughout the ages has generally been reductive, and its victim of choice has been medium-sized everyday objects. One form of materialism tears these objects down to reveal their deeper physical foundations, as if mocking them from below. Another rejects the reality of these objects for precisely the opposite reason, denying them any depth beneath the way they are given to us, as if jeering from above. Given the apparent opposition of these two strategies, it is remarkable that both are often denoted with the term 'materialism'. Although I used to wonder why the second was called materialism at all, I now think there is good reason to accept this dual usage. For the two positions share much in common, are beginning to form a strong unspoken alliance, and are even on the brink of dominating continental philosophy in our time." - Harmon 2010: 774

"Staunchly opposed to essentialism of any sort, ANT sees the world as immanent, contingent, absolutely heterogeneous, and as ontologically flat, disclosing no other levels, final explanations or hidden core. [584] ...

"[W]hereas Marcuse-style critical urban theory expressly engages with politics, ANT pointedly sticks to an apolitical, ironic stance. ... [O]ntological boundary-pushing is grafted onto epistemological boundary-policing. It verges towards something like a postsocial, reconstituted positivism. ... [T]he very category of 'radical' — of getting to the root of things — is completely alien to the actor-network worldview. ANT’s supposed radicality undermines itself. Its version of relationality, far from being radical, is so broad and undifferentiated as to blur the many diverse ways that things interact, rather than bringing relational difference into sharper focus. Unable to detect exclusion, negation, or antagonism, ANT, unaided by other sociological sensitivities, has a hard time dealing with some of the most obvious and horrific aspects of contemporary urban life. While it registers that networks decay and break down, this is an insufficient way to think conflict and inequality. As a consequence, most actor-network studies of cities tend to eschew analyzing exclusion, domination, elitism, racism, patriarchy, exploitation, segregation or any other variety of ubiquitous, quotidian urban violence the denial of which renders any urban studies paradigm useless at best. [586-7]" - Madden 2010

"It is not enough to evoke a metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality, in the manner for instance of ‘object-oriented philosophies’, since the absence of any reliable cognitive criteria by which to measure and specify the precise extent of the gap between seeming and being or discriminate between the extrinsic and intrinsic properties of objects licenses entirely arbitrary claims about the in-itself." - Brassier 2011: 52

"Does the term assemblage describe a type of hitherto-neglected research object to be studied in a broadly political-economic framework-thus generating a political economy of urban assemblages? Is assemblage analysis meant to extend the methodology of urban political economy in new directions, thus opening up new interpretive perspectives on dimensions of capitalist urbanization that have been previously neglected or only partially grasped? Or, does the assemblage approach offer a new ontological starting point that displaces or supersedes the intellectual project of urban political economy?" - Brenner et al. 2011: 230

"Perhaps the major advantage of introducing the concept of assemblage into the field of urban studies (cf. Bender, 2009; Farías, 2009b [see 2009]; McCann and Ward, 2011; McFarlane, 2011 [see 2011a]) is that it allows us to move away from a notion of the city as a whole to a notion of the city as multiplicity, from the study of 'the' urban environment to the study of multiple urban assemblages. The concept is thus coined to make sense of processes of construction by which cities, urban phenomena and urban life are constituted. Yet the constructivism underlying the notion of urban assemblages does not reflect an epistemological problem, but is an ontological proposition." - Farías 2011: 369

"Harman claims to get at the reality that the sciences can never describe by closely describing the structure of seeming. Far from challenging the retreat of philosophers from the world into the bastion of consciousness, he has simply extended the domain of consciousness into the world." - Wolfendale 2012: 365

"Any strand of urban research reflects ontological positions about the constitution of the world, and we have to be careful not to suggest that assemblage thinking can be ontological while other strands of urban thinking somehow remain non-ontological, that is, without any implicit or explicit claims about the nature of the urban world, its constitution and its being. ... I am not suggesting here that it is possible for one approach to have more than one ontology at a time, but that does not mean that different ontologies cannot offer prompts, questions, generative conflict, directions and orientations to one another, or, crucially, that an ontology of assemblage supersedes political economy." - McFarlane 2011b: 377

"I've titled this review essay 'The Nadir of OOO' because I think that the absurdities of Realist Magic are due at least in part to those it inherits from the incoherent ontology it wants to popularize and extend. In order to stake its claim to originality and supremacy, 'OOO' has to fulminate against what it sees as a threatening field: materialists, purveyors of 'scientism,' process philosophers, Deleuzians, and systems theorists. It has to establish itself as 'the only non-reductionist, non-atomic ontology on the market.' So Marx, as well, will have to be laid low. Since it would be difficult to mount a plausible or relevant critique of historical materialism from a perspective committed to a universe of objects withdrawn from relation, the object-oriented ontologist can only flail wildly at his target, hoping to construct arguments so preposterous that they can’t possibly be accused of trying to be serious." - Taylor 2013: 68

"Both Marx's and Heidegger's thought are grounded in an understanding of history, and above all, how philosophy itself is historical. ... The productive dialogue that arises between Heidegger and Marx does so through Hegel, and through the interpretation of history." - Hemming 2013: 41


“French soldiers, Russian troops falling back from Borodino, and vengeful Muscovites burned down two-thirds of Moscow’s buildings during the occupation of September 2-October 11, 1812” - Colton 1995: 32

Vladimir Semenov — civil engineer, author of Blagoustroistvo gorodov, met Ebenezer Howard in England — begins Prozorovka, now Kratovo, the “first Russian Garden City” (although there was an earlier one built in Riga), more in “Pervyi gorod-sad v Rossii,” Gorodskoe delo, 1912, No. 22: 1398-1403 - Starr 1976: 234, 242

"[Bertrand] Russell's book The Prospects of Industrial Civilization [1923] was written following a visit to Russia in 1920 that he made with a delegation sent by the Trades Union Congress, with the aim of learning directly about the political and economic conditions of the country under a Bolshevik government [on this visit he met Trotsky and interviewed Lenin]. ... Although Russell’s research was not intended as a contribution to a particular discipline, and he had no expertise in social research, he nonetheless conducted a type of fieldwork that drew together his reading of Marxist texts with direct observations of political and working conditions in Russia and of daily life in Moscow." - Barry 2013: 35

Formation of Gosplan: "The first substantial efforts at national planning are generally traced back to GOELRO — the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (Gosudarstvennaia Komissiia po Elektrifikatsii Rossii) — formed in the midst of the Civil War in early 1920. In one sense, the Commission took up a familiar role of the tsarist government: investing in infrastructure to promote national development and military strength. But it introduced a novel biopolitical proposition that would prove to have shattering implications. Namely, that state-directed infrastructure development must be linked to a total plan for the industrial development of the country as a whole. ... Specific organizations and individuals (first of all Krzhizhanovskii) who were central to GOELRO were also central to the first five-year plan. GOELRO itself was incorporated into Gosplan, the agency formed in early 1921 that, by the second half of the 1920s, became the preeminent planning body in the Soviet Union ... ." - Collier 2011: 49-53

February: "... in February 2013, President Vladimir Putin signed the law on extension of free privatization of housing till 2015." - Shomina and Heywood 2013: 322


"German zoologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) coined the neologism ecology in a textbook (1866) on the morphology, taxonomy, and evolution of animals. Ecology is a combination of the ancient Greek words oikos and logos. Oikos means 'house, not only of built houses, but of any dwelling place,' 'domicile of a plant' (Liddell and Scott 1968: 1204, 1205). ... Hence ecology means 'the scientific study of the earthly dwelling place' or 'home.' A synonymous term used by Russian scientists is biogeocoenosis, which means 'life and earth functioning together' (E.P. Odum 1993: 27). A social reformer and interpreter of Darwin, Haeckel's motivation for coining this new word was to draw attention to the inclusive study of organisms in the environment, in contradistinction to the narrower study of organisms in the laboratory (the province of physiology). To emphasize the investigation of organisms in their natural setting and the operations of natural selection, Haeckel wanted to distinguish ecology from biology in the narrow sense of dealing with the structure and classification of organisms themselves." - Keller and Golley 2000: 7-9, see also Odom and Barrett 2005: 2-3

"In January 1869, Haeckel gave his most eloquent definition of ecology in an inaugural lecture at the University of Jena (Stauffer 1957: 141): 'By ecology we mean the body of knowledge concerning the economy of nature — the investigation of the total relations of the animal both to its inorganic and to its organic environment; including, above all, its friendly and inimical relations with those animals and plants with which it comes directly or indirectly into contact — in a word, ecology is the study of all those complex interrelations referred to by Darwin as the conditions of the struggle for existence. This science of ecology, often inaccurately referred to as "biology" in a narrow sense, has thus far formed the principal component of what is commonly referred to as "Natural History."' (Haeckel 1879)" - Keller and Golley 2000: 9

"1885, Hanns Reiter used ecology in the title of a book for the first time (Egerton 1977: 195), and interest in ecology developed rapidly." - Keller and Golley 2000: 9

"1893, John Burden-Sanderson, president of the Royal Society of Great Britain, commented that the future of ecology was especially bright because it dealt with organisms in their environments (Burden-Sanderson 1893)." - Keller and Golley 2000: 9

"Burdon-Sanderson (1893), the Madison Botanical Congress of 1893, and the Congress of Arts and Sciences meeting at St. Louis in 1904 recognized ecology as of equal rank with morphology and physiology [in forming the components of biology]. ... Burdon-Sanderson considered physiology as dealing with the internal actions of the organism and its parts, using the methods of physics and chemistry; ecology, he said, explored the external relations of animals and plants under natural conditions." - McIntosh 1985: 39

"Universities began to offer ecology courses, and in 1913 the first professional society, the British Ecological Society, was established (Sheail 1987)." - Keller and Golley 2000: 9

"Sir Arthur C. Tansley first proposed the term 'ecosystem' in 1935 ..." - Barrett 2005: 3

"The concept of integrative levels of organization is a general description of the evolution of matter through successive and higher orders of complexity and integration. It views the development of matter, from the cosmological changes resulting in the formation of the earth to the social changes in society, as continuous because it is never-ending, and as discontinuous because it passes through a series of different levels of organization — physical, chemical, biological and sociological.

"In the continual evolution of matter, new levels of complexity are superimposed on the individual units by the organization and integration of those units into a single system. What were wholes on one level become parts on a higher one. Each level of organization possesses unique properties of structure and behavior which, though dependent on the properties of the constituent elements, appear only when these elements are combined in the new system. ... The laws describing the unique properties of each level are qualitatively distinct, and their discovery requires methods of research and analysis appropriate to the particular level." - Novikoff 1945: 209

"What can best be described as a worldwide environmental awareness movement burst upon the scene during two years, 1968-1970, as astronauts took the first photographs of Earth as seen from outer space. For the first time in human history, we were able to see Earth as a whole and to realize how alone and fragile Earth hovers in space." - Odom and Barrett 2005: 3

"Before the 1970s, ecology was viewed largely as a subdiscipline of biology. ... Although ecology remains strongly rooted in biology, it has emerged from biology as an essentially new, integrative discipline that links physical and biological processes and forms a bridge between the natural sciences and the social sciences (E. P. Odum 1977)." - Odom and Barrett 2005: 4

"[Political ecology] combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself." - Blaikie and Brookfield 1987:17

"[T]here is no 'original' state in nature, no nature-in-itself in the sense that a fixed set of characteristics holds true, like the law of gravity, always and everywhere. Nature resembles less a law than a story. And the story is not over. Thus to inquire of nature is to inquire of time, of circumstance and of contingency." - Dobb 1992: 47

"Ecological science, like other modern sciences, aspired to identify general laws that would explain its observations. However, as generalizations have been proposed and even applied, inevitably exceptions have been found. The specific replaces the general. ... increasingly ecology has become a science of case studies. ... [E]cology is grounded in several fundamental principles, including the principles of system and evolution. System is concerned with the question: How does it work? Evolution is concerned with the question: How did this system come to be this way? ... An ecosystem has at least two parts: organisms and an environment." - Keller and Golley 2000: 10

"To understand ecology thoroughly would be to understand all of biology, and to be a complete biologist is to be an ecologist. ... the pursuit of public health is largely an application of ecology." - Wilson 2005: xiii

"The problem of world-earth opens up contemporary concerns with the environment and globalisation, which Heidegger was grappling with. If his credentials as a foundational theorist of certain types of ecological thinking are well known, through an engagement with his writings on technology and poetic dwelling (Foltz, 1995; Zimmerman, 1993), what is less understood is how such themes emerged in his work of the 1930s, within this particular political context, most notably in the Beiträge. Heidegger's argument is complicated, and hinges on the reduction of the Greek physis to the Latin natura, the root for our term 'nature'. For Heidegger, even in 1936-38, in technology (die Technik) nature is destroyed because it is separated from human beings, it is seen as a separate realm from human existence. In part, this is the argument against Descartes found in Being and Time, where Descartes's separation of the mind and body is challenged with the idea of being-in-the-world. Heidegger argues that the originary, more rooted sense of physis is lost as nature is seen as a being itself, 'and, after this demoting [Absetzung], ultimately reduced to the full force of calculating machination and economy' (1989, page 277). Nature becomes res extensa, an extended material resource. The natural no longer has any 'immediate relation to physis, but rather is fully set-up [gestellt] according to the machinational' (page 133). ... Heidegger's argument here is that nature is never pure but is always already social, but also that the very idea of nature in some supposedly pure state is already a reductive understanding." Elden 2005a: 819-20

"[U]rban political ecology provides an integrated and relational approach that helps untangle the interconnected economic, political, social and ecological processes that together form highly uneven urban sociophysical landscapes." - Heynen et al. 2006: 15

"Instead of seeing cities as social rather than natural, or urban injustice and inequality as natural rather than social, UPE [urban political ecology] made cities visible as political worlds, the politics of which are constitutively socionatural." - Angelo and Wachsmuth forthcoming)

public space

"What the word for space, Raum, Rum, designates is said by its ancient meaning. Raum means a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging. A space is something that has been made room for, something that- namely within a boundary, Greek peras. A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing." - Heidegger 2001 [1951]: 152

"Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit — in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. ...

"The National Parks present another instance of the working out of the tragedy of the commons. At present, they are open to all, without limit. The parks themselves are limited in extent ... whereas population seems to grow without limit. The values that visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded. Plainly, we must soon cease to treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone.

"What shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off as private property. We might keep them as public property, but allocate the right enter them. The allocation might be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some agreed-upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first-served basis, administered to long queues. These, I think, are all the reasonable possibilities. They are all objectionable. But we must choose — or acquiesce in the destruction of the commons ..." - Hardin 1968: 1244-5

"Place is a pause in movement." - Tuan 2001 [1977]: 138

"[Territory is] a human strategy to affect, influence, and control.

"Territoriality in humans is best thought of not as biologically motivated, but rather as socially and geographically rooted. Its use depends on who is influencing and controlling whom and on the geographical contexts of place, space, and time. Territoriality is intimately related to how people use the land, how they organize themselves in space, and how they give meaning to place. Clearly these relationships change, and the best means of studying them is to reveal their changing character over time." - Sack 1986: 2

"[P]rivatization is not the same thing as destatification. Ownership, to begin with, is a bundle of rights ... divided between government and individuals under state socialism, and ... divided between government and individuals in Western capitalist countries. Rights to use and to limit use, rights to build and to limit building, rights to sell and to tax the proceeds of sale, rights to transfer on death and to determine survivors’ claims, all are divided in varying ways in varying countries; nowhere are they absolute on either the private or the governmental side." - Marcuse 1996: 119

"At the level of locality — that is, thе regions, settlements and neighbourhoods where we live and work and where we co-exist with each other and other species — multiple conflicts over changes to local environments are critical preoccupations of local social and political life. They form a substantial part of the agendas of local newspapers, radio and television programmes, and of daily conversation. We puzzle over how to manage our co-existence in shared spaces. ...

"Planning systems and practices, however much they may become routinised into unquestioned procedures, have their power and justification in the role they play in helping the political communities of places work out how to manage their collective concerns about the qualities of shared spaces and local environments." - Healey 1997: 3-4

"We are all familiar with the effect of human thought and activity on the landscapes in which human beings dwell. Human beings change the land around them in a way and on a scale matched, for the most part, by no other animal. The land around us is a reflection, not only of our practical and technological capacities, but also of our culture and society — of our very needs, our hopes, our preoccupations and dreams. ... [Y]et the human relation to the land, and to the environing world in general, is clearly not a relation characterised by an influence running in just one direction. ... [O]ur relation to landscape and environment is indeed one of our own affectivity as much as of our ability to effect." - Malpas 2004 [1999]: 1

"The theoretical and empirical support for the notion that sense of community (particularly its affective dimensions) can be created via physical design factors is ambiguous at best. New urbanism is supported by the fact that research demonstrates a link between resident interaction and environment, and therefore the correlation between public/private space integration and resident interaction is sustained. But to move beyond interaction towards the affective dimensions of sense of community is problematic since the effectuation of a sense of community in these terms is usually only achieved via some intermediate variable (for example, resident homogeneity, affluence). This leaves open the question of whether or not any number of other design creeds could produce the same result via a different design philosophy." - Talen 1999: 1374

"Lefebvre [1991] is interested in moving our curiosity from primarily considering notions of 'things in space' to also encompassing the process of 'producing space'. As a mechanism for achieving that shift, he identifies three linked moments of social space ['a triplicate epistemology of space' (70)]: spatial practice (perceived space), representations of space (conceived space), and representational space (lived space). ... Each space assumes meaning through the others, each space contains the other two, and so hard lines should not be drawn between them." - Thompson-Fawcett 2003: 69

"[T]he topology that comes to appearance in Being and Time is a fundamentally temporal one—which does not mean that place is not at issue, but rather that place is itself understood as fundamentally temporal. In itself, this need not be a problem—place is indeed temporal—but it becomes problematic when the attempt is made to establish temporality alone as the ground for place. Place is temporal, but it is also spatial (and so also stands in an essential relation to body). Moreover, it is not that place is to be derived from temporality, instead temporality has to be itself understood in relation to the temporalizing/spatializing of the happening/gathering that is place." - Malpas 2006: 63

"In the first edition of Managing the Commons [Hardin and Baden 1977], Elinor Ostrom initiated the search for examples of non-state means of 'governing the commons,' as she later titled her book, and suggested that Hardin may have been too 'pessimistic.' ... Marshaling empirical evidence of practices that did not conform to dominant models of property relations, Ostrom also brought public choice into closer dialogue with the neoliberal Law and Economics school of jurisprudence. Given the nature of many resources, scholars in both fields found they could not afford a strict private-public binary when developing their paradigms for property rights. The examples of successfully administered common property regimes uncovered by Ostrom, her followers, and dozens of anthropologists investigating societies around the world demonstrated that 'market failure' — that is, problems governing or allocating many resources that the market could not efficiently organize — could be solved through nonmarket mechanisms other than a central state. [68] ... Whether commons represents an alternative to market failure or commons prescribes market salvation, what it does not represent in the discourse of contemporary social science or law or even popular common sense is a property regime that can evolve into public property and hence public space. [75]" - Blackmar 2006

"[D]esign features [associated] with crime and social isolation in modernist housing estates ... include confusions between public and semi-public space, networks of paths and walkways where residents are unlikely to encounter each other, confusions between the fronts and backs of buildings, communal entrances that are unsupervised, used by too many people and are of poor quality and isolated and public areas that lack 'natural surveillance'. Such observations have been tempered by holistic studies of design and management that have found that whilst design is a significant factor in the production of hostile residential environments, it is not in itself a determinant and management practices play a strong part." - Roberts 2007: 184

"Some have argued that what is required is a design-led approach to public space management in order that the complexities are fully understood. In England, the government-convened Urban Task Force (1999) [2005] contended that 'More than 90 per cent of our urban fabric will be with us in 30 years time' and that as a consequence this is where the real 'urban quality' challenge lies, rather than with the much smaller proportion of newly designed spaces created each year. They argued, however, that the way spaces look and feel today and the ease with which they can be managed relates fundamentally to how they were designed in the first place. Moreover, because every subsequent intervention in space (following its initial development) has an impact upon its overall quality, the importance of design skills remains fundamental.

"This does not imply that all those involved in the management of public space need to be designers in an artistic sense, and some have argued that the over-design of spaces to the detriment of other factors can be problematic when much everyday space is often (and quite appropriately) banal or untidy in order to be functional and versatile ... . It does imply, however, that interventions (no matter how small) should be considered creatively and sensitively, involving weighing-up and balancing options and impacts in order to find the 'optimum' given solution within the constraints set by context and resources." - Carmona et al. 2008: 8


"Through habits formed in intercourse with the world, we also in-habit the world. It becomes a home, and the home is part of our every experience." - Dewey 1958: 104

"To inhabit is necessarily to inhabit a world, that is to say, to have there much more than a place of sojourn: its place, in the strong sense of the term, as that which allows something to properly take place. ... What takes place takes place in a world and by way of that world. A world is the common place of a totality of places: of presences and dispositions for possible events. ...

"A world is an ethos, a habitus and an inhabiting ..." - Nancy 2007: 42


"The degree to which the contemporary world may be said to be 'urban' is not fully or accurately measured by the proportion of the total population living in cities. The influences which cities exert upon the social life of man are greater than the ratio of the urban population would indicate, for the city is not only in ever larger degrees the dwelling-place and workshop of modern man, but it is the initiating and controlling center of economic, political, and cultural life that has drawn the most remote parts of the world into its orbit and woven diverse areas, peoples, and activities into a cosmos." - Wirth 1937: 2

"The capitalism of Karl Marx or Fernand Braudel is not the total capitalism of the Marxists (Braudel, 1985). It is a skein of somewhat longer networks that rather inadequately embrace a world on the basis of points that become centres of profit and calculation. In following it step by step, one never crosses the mysterious limes that should divide the local from the global. The organization of American big business ... is a braid of networks materialized in order slips and flow charts, local procedures and special arrangements, which permit it to spread to an entire continent so long as it does not cover that continent. One can follow the growth of an organization in its entirety without ever changing levels and without ever discovering 'decontextualized' rationality. The very size of a totalitarian State is obtained only by the construction of a network of statistics and calculations, of offices and inquiries, which in no way corresponds to the fantastic topography of the total State ... . Yet these 'networks of power' and these 'lines of force' do extend across the entire world. The markets described by the Economy of conventions are indeed regulated and global, even though none of the causes of that regulation and that aggregation is itself either global or total. The aggregates are not made from some substance different from what they are aggregating ... . No visible or invisible hand suddenly descends to bring order to dispersed and chaotic individual atoms. The two extremes, local and global, are much less interesting than the intermediary arrangements that we are calling networks." - Latour 1993 [1991]: 121-2

"Global city formation cannot be adequately understood without an examination of the matrices of state territorial organization within and through which it occurs. The globalization of urbanization and the glocalization of state territorial power are two deeply intertwined moments of a single process of global restructuring through which the scales of capitalist sociospatial organization have been reconfigured since the early 1970s." - Brenner 1998: 27

"'Glocalisation' refers to the twin process whereby, firstly, institutional/regulatory arrangements shift from the national scale both upwards to supra-national or global scales and downwards to the scale of the individual body or to local, urban or regional configurations and, secondly, economic activities and inter-firm networks are becoming simultaneously more localised/regionalised and transnational." - Swyngedouw 2004: 25

"From his earliest works Heidegger refused the separation of mind and matter, and analysed what he called being-in-the-world. Lefebvre notes the importance of Heidegger's analysis of world — as image, symbol, myth and place. For Heidegger, in a way similar to our dealings with equipment, we encounter space geometrically only when we pause to think about it, when we conceptualize it." - Elden 2004b: 188

"The historical moment we call globalisation demonstrates that the calculable understanding of space has been extended to the globe, which means that even as the state becomes less the focus of attention territory remains of paramount importance. Territory therefore is a political way of conceiving of calculable space (see Elden, 2005b)." - Elden 2005a: 823

"[U]nder contemporary circumstances, the urban can no longer be viewed as a distinct, relatively bounded site; it has instead become a generalized, planetary condition in and through which the accumulation of capital, the regulation of political-economic life, the reproduction of everyday social relations and the contestation of the earth and humanity’s possible futures are simultaneously organized and fought out. In light of this, it is increasingly untenable to view urban questions as merely one among many specialized subtopics to which a critical theoretical approach may be applied ... [but, on the contrary, each of its key methodological and political orientations] requires sustained engagement with contemporary worldwide patterns of capitalist urbanization and their far-reaching consequences for social, political, economic and human/nature relations." - Brenner 2009: 206

"Both Nancy and Lefebvre understand globalization as a fundamentally violent and unequal process that unfolds through the uneven expansion of a particular sort of urban space. They both strive to articulate a critical stance towards this process by opposing globalization to the idea of mondialisation or world forming. While their respective approaches differ in important ways, they both provide indispensable critical tools for conceptualizing the urban planet and its political possibilities. [772] ...

"Globalization ... has something threatening and overwhelming about it. The qualities of enclosure, finality, and totalistic lack of differentiation are central to it. Mondialisation, in contrast, stands for incompleteness, becoming, openness, natality. The term refers to becoming-worldwide, or 'worldwide becoming', 'world forming', or the 'creation of the world'. [775]" - Madden 2012, see also Nancy 2007: 33-4

the everyday

"In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into a kind of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the 'they' is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find shocking. The 'they', which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness." - Heidegger 2001 [1926]: 164

"The film has enriched our field of perception with methods which can be illustrated by those of Freudian theory. Fifty years ago, a slip of the tongue passed more or less unnoticed. Only exceptionally may such a slip have revealed dimensions of depth in a conversation which had seemed to be taking its course on the surface. Since the Psychopathology of Everyday Life things have changed. This book isolated and made analyzable things which had heretofore floated along unnoticed in the broad stream of perception. For the entire spectrum of optical, and now also acoustical, perception the film has brought about a similar deepening of apperception. It is only an obverse of this fact that behavior items shown in a movie can be analyzed much more precisely and from more points of view than those presented on paintings or on the stage. As compared with painting, filmed behavior lends itself more readily to analysis because of its incomparably more precise statements of the situation. In comparison with the stage scene, the filmed behavior item lends itself more readily to analysis because it can be isolated more easily." - Benjamin 2007 [1936]: 235-6

"The procedures of everyday creativity ... [In Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish], instead of analyzing the apparatus exercising power (i. e., the localizable, expansionist, repressive, and legal institutions), Foucault analyzes the mechanisms (dispositifs) that have sapped the strength of these institutions and surreptitiously reorganized the functioning of power: 'miniscule' technical procedures acting on and with details, redistributing a discursive space in order to make it the means of a generalized 'discipline' (surveillance). This approach raises a new and different set of problems to be investigated. Once again, however, this 'microphysics of power' privileges the productive apparatus (which produces the 'discipline'), even though it discerns in 'education' a system of 'repression' and shows how, from the wings as it were, silent technologies determine or short-circuit institutional stage directions. If it is true that the grid of 'discipline' is everywhere becoming clearer and more extensive, it is all the more urgent to discover how an entire society resists being reduced to it, what popular procedures (also 'miniscule' and quotidian) manipulate the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in order to evade them, and finally, what 'ways of operating' form the counterpart, on the consumer's (or 'dominee's'?) side, of the mute processes that organize the establishment of socioeconomic order.

"These 'ways of operating' constitute the innumerable practices by means of which users reappropriate the space organized by techniques of sociocultural production. They pose questions at once analogous and contrary to those dealt with in Foucault's book: analogous, in that the goal is to perceive and analyze the microbe-like operations proliferating within technocratic structures and deflecting their functioning by means of a multitude of 'tactics' articulated in the details of everyday life; contrary, in that the goal is not to make clearer how the violence of order is transmuted into a disciplinary technology, but rather to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, tactical, and makeshift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in the nets of 'discipline.' Pushed to their ideal limits, these procedures and ruses of consumers compose the network of an antidiscipline which is the subject of this book." - de Certeau 1984: xiv-xv

"Whilst everyday life is of course a broadening of the scope of Marx's notion of alienation to areas outside the economic, it is equally very close to Lukács' [1971] and Heidegger's [1962] notion of Alltäglichkeit [everydayness] ... . Just as Marx turned Hegel’s abstract notion of alienation into a concrete analysis of human reality, Lefebvre is critical of both Heidegger’s abstraction, and the attribution of primitivity, triviality and anonymity to the notion of everyday life ... . Lefebvre sees Marx’s Capital as making the abstract concepts of 'man' and 'humanity' concrete, into praxis ... " - Elden 2004a: 91 (see also Elden 2004b: 112)

"The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of 'neoliberalism'. The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify 'the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale' (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality ... can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa." - Barnett 2005: 11

"Heidegger's suggestion — and quite possibly the most complicated one that he makes in the Beiträge in relation to geography — is that we should think time-space as Abgrund. What does he mean by this? Abgrund is the German word for abyss, so time-space is abyssal, unfathomable, without ground ... or, rather, from ground, from the depths. An impossible encounter that makes possible what follows. From the Ab-grund comes the Grund, from the abyss, the foundation, and this 'in the way of temporalising and spatialising'. ... [Abgrund evokes a path] from the commonplace to the elevation of being. In other words, it is a move from the everyday ... to the question of being." - Elden 2005a: 823

"Engels, when he rediscovered the concept of ideology in 1888 (in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy), already proposed to demonstrate what makes the State the 'first ideological power' and to uncover the law of historical succession of the 'world-views' or forms of the dominant ideology which confer their (religious or juridical) legitimacy on class-based states. By contrast, it is within the legacy of the analysis of fetishism that one must look both for the phenomenologies of 'everyday life' governed by the logic of the commodity or by the symbolics of value (the Frankfurt School, Henri Lefebvre, Guy Debord, Agnes Heller) ..." - Balibar 2007: 78-9