2003
"[A]lthough Heidegger clearly recognizes the importance of history, in Being and Time it is largely defined as a characteristic of Dasein, rather than as a methodological issue. There are strong reasons for this. First, Husserlian phenomenology was basically ahistorical, perhaps because of Husserl's background in mathematics and logic. ... Krell [1992] has argued that for Heidegger, the history of philosophy was an 'essential counterweight to phenomenology'; whereas Husserl had once remarked that he had 'forgotten about history,' Heidegger never did. [192] ...
"[H]istorical ontology ... [is] almost synonymous with genealogy. This notion of historical ontology is at work in Heidegger's readings of technology, the housing crisis in postwar Germany, the polis in the early 1940s, and other later concerns. All of these are oriented as critiques of the present. Indeed, in Being and Time, Heidegger talks of the 'ontological task of constructing a non-deductive genealogy of the different possible ways of being.' ...
"In Foucault's understanding of archaeology, for an énoncé to be accepted within a discipline — even before it can be pronounced true or false — it must 'fulfill complex and serious demands'; it must be, in Canguilhem's phrase, 'within the true.' [196] ...
"Though geneaology is sometimes seen as a replacement for archaeology, it is better to see the two as existing together, as two halves of a complementary approach. Archaeology looks at truth as 'a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of énoncés,' while genealogy sees truth as 'linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it.' [198] ...
"Genealogy was for Nietzche a critical history; it was untimely in the sense that it was 'acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come.' ... Nietzshe's critical history became for Heidegger a critique of the present, a critique that was historicized in Heidegger's later works. For Foucault it becomes a history of the present. [199] ...
"Discipline and Punish is, as Foucault says, 'a genealogy of the modern 'soul.' Likewise, The History of Sexuality is not simply an examination of sexuality and subjectivity, but a genealogy of the subject precisely in order to circumvent these notions. All of these works of genealogy can be read as historical ontologies ... framed as histories of the present. Noting how Foucault's connaissance/savoir distinction parallels Heidegger's ontic/ontological difference allows us to see both the continuity between archaeology and genealogy and the continuity between two of the twentieth century's foremost thinkers. [202]" - Elden 2003
"[H]istorical ontology ... [is] almost synonymous with genealogy. This notion of historical ontology is at work in Heidegger's readings of technology, the housing crisis in postwar Germany, the polis in the early 1940s, and other later concerns. All of these are oriented as critiques of the present. Indeed, in Being and Time, Heidegger talks of the 'ontological task of constructing a non-deductive genealogy of the different possible ways of being.' ...
"In Foucault's understanding of archaeology, for an énoncé to be accepted within a discipline — even before it can be pronounced true or false — it must 'fulfill complex and serious demands'; it must be, in Canguilhem's phrase, 'within the true.' [196] ...
"Though geneaology is sometimes seen as a replacement for archaeology, it is better to see the two as existing together, as two halves of a complementary approach. Archaeology looks at truth as 'a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of énoncés,' while genealogy sees truth as 'linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it.' [198] ...
"Genealogy was for Nietzche a critical history; it was untimely in the sense that it was 'acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come.' ... Nietzshe's critical history became for Heidegger a critique of the present, a critique that was historicized in Heidegger's later works. For Foucault it becomes a history of the present. [199] ...
"Discipline and Punish is, as Foucault says, 'a genealogy of the modern 'soul.' Likewise, The History of Sexuality is not simply an examination of sexuality and subjectivity, but a genealogy of the subject precisely in order to circumvent these notions. All of these works of genealogy can be read as historical ontologies ... framed as histories of the present. Noting how Foucault's connaissance/savoir distinction parallels Heidegger's ontic/ontological difference allows us to see both the continuity between archaeology and genealogy and the continuity between two of the twentieth century's foremost thinkers. [202]" - Elden 2003
2005
"[T]he reassertion of space within social theory can neither be at the expense of time, nor allow space to be assimilated into an otherwise unproblematised historical method (Elden, 2001a [2001]; for a related argument see Lefebvre, 2004)." - Elden 2005a: 821
2010
"[ANT] case studies that do examine politics and inequality do so by drawing upon theoretical languages beyond that of actors and networks. [587] ...
"Couldn’t ANT, in its own way, become a networked 'critical urban theory' (Brenner 2009)? Couldn't ANT provide a decentered-but-still-critical urban sociology of associations, with a lot of interesting case studies? It seems unlikely. If there is anything left to Horkheimer's idea that critical inquiry means getting to 'the human bottom of nonhuman things' (Horkheimer 1972, p. 143), then a critical ANT — call it CANT — is impossible and mutually unwanted. Some actor-network theory can help urbanists critically rethink the nature of urban phenomena ... . But with too much ANT, critical urban studies would be impossible. [588]" - Madden 2010
"Couldn’t ANT, in its own way, become a networked 'critical urban theory' (Brenner 2009)? Couldn't ANT provide a decentered-but-still-critical urban sociology of associations, with a lot of interesting case studies? It seems unlikely. If there is anything left to Horkheimer's idea that critical inquiry means getting to 'the human bottom of nonhuman things' (Horkheimer 1972, p. 143), then a critical ANT — call it CANT — is impossible and mutually unwanted. Some actor-network theory can help urbanists critically rethink the nature of urban phenomena ... . But with too much ANT, critical urban studies would be impossible. [588]" - Madden 2010
2012
"Assemblage thinking entails finding explanations in thick empirical descriptions of how ... multiple relations are aligned across differences and actualised. It situates the social and the material in the same ontological frame, but that does not mean that materialities always function politically in the same way or have the same performative force over time or between groups, nor does it assume in advance that the 'social' or the 'material' are likely to have more impact in particular contexts — these are empirical questions. ...
"[I]n focusing on how urban processes are made concrete, lived and contested in everyday practice, assemblage lingers with the possibility of what can be understood by paying close attention to what happens at particular urban sites, before skipping over to pre-given analytical frames that might encapsulate something 'bigger'. Close examination of particular sites helps us to make sense of how urban life operates through practices of routine, disruption, violence, demolition, breakdown, improvisation, coping and uncertainty in the assembling and disassembling of the everyday." - McFarlane 2011b: 381
"[I]n focusing on how urban processes are made concrete, lived and contested in everyday practice, assemblage lingers with the possibility of what can be understood by paying close attention to what happens at particular urban sites, before skipping over to pre-given analytical frames that might encapsulate something 'bigger'. Close examination of particular sites helps us to make sense of how urban life operates through practices of routine, disruption, violence, demolition, breakdown, improvisation, coping and uncertainty in the assembling and disassembling of the everyday." - McFarlane 2011b: 381
2013
"[G]enealogy at its best involves a practice of critique in the form of the historical problematization of the present." - Koopman 2013: 2
