dwelling

1951
"To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. It pervades dwelling in its whole range. That range reveals itself to us as soon as we reflect that human being consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the earth. [147] ... The nature of building is letting dwell. Building accomplishes its nature in the raising of locations by the joining of their spaces. Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build. ... [Dwelling] is the basic character of Being in keeping with which mortals exist. [158] ...

"The truck driver is at home on the highway, but he does not have his shelter there; the working woman is at home in the spinning mill, but does not have her dwelling place there; the chief engineer is at home in the power station, but he does not dwell there. These buildings house man. He inhabits them and yet does not dwell in them, when to dwell means merely that we take shelter in them. In today's housing shortage even this much is reassuring and to the good; residential buildings do indeed provide shelter; today's houses may even be well planned, easy to keep, attractively cheap, open to air, light, and sun, but-do the houses in themselves hold any guarantee that dwelling occurs in them? Yet those buildings that are not dwelling places remain in turn determined by dwelling insofar as they serve man's dwelling. Thus dwelling would in any case be the end that presides over all building. [143-4] ... However hard and bitter, however hampering and threatening the lack of houses remains, the real plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses. The real plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with their destruction, older also than the increase of the earth's population and the condition of the industrial workers. The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell ... [159]" - Heidegger 2001 [1951]


1999
"We do not have to decide on our own, as one did under the old speculative metaphysics, about the furnishing of the world; we have only to define the equipment, instruments, skills, and knowledge that will allow experimental metaphysics to start up again, in order to decide collectively on its habitat, its oikos, its familiar dwelling." - Latour 2004 [1999]: 136


2004
"In a late poem, Hölderlin suggested that 'poetically, man dwells on the earth' (1961: 245-246). For Heidegger, this notion of dwelling, wohnen, is precisely this way of inhabiting the world in a lived, experienced manner instead of one of calculative planning (see, for example, 1971: 213). Indeed, this notion of dwelling is the direct opposite of the understanding of technology that Heidegger thinks holds sway in the modern world." - Elden 2004a: 92 (see also Elden 2004b: 188)


2011
"An ecological perspective on the city does not just involve symmetrically accounting for the multiple intermingling of human and nonhuman entities, but also, as Ingold (2000) has suggested, requires us to restrain from the common 'building perspective' that assumes that 'worlds are made before they are lived in, that acts of dwelling are preceded by acts of worldmaking' (p. 179). A dwelling perspective instead involves focusing on the dynamic and transactional unit formed by an organism-in-its-environment (we could be quoting Dewey here). Thus, instead of explaining how 'the' socio-natural environment of the city is historically constructed, the focus is rather on the multiple ways of dwelling in the city, in the understanding that these involve multiple ways of constructing the city." - Farías 2011: 369


2012
"Without an insistence upon political–economic transformation, the affirmation of urbanism can easily degrade into cheerleading for conspicuous neighborhood consumption, 'smart' technocracy, or renewal-as-gentrification—the sort of policies that a segment of planners, politicians, and real-estate developers pursue everywhere in the name of 'livability' and the 'creative' city. Today, precisely when older critical perspectives have been abandoned, discourses about dwelling, inhabitation, the right to the city, indeed urbanism itself, always threaten, as if by radioactive decay, to lose their critical content and sink back into a neoliberal lifestyle politics." - Madden 2012: 783, see also 774-5

methodology

2003
"[A]lthough Heidegger clearly recognizes the importance of history, in Being and Time it is largely defined as a characteristic of Dasein, rather than as a methodological issue. There are strong reasons for this. First, Husserlian phenomenology was basically ahistorical, perhaps because of Husserl's background in mathematics and logic. ... Krell [1992] has argued that for Heidegger, the history of philosophy was an 'essential counterweight to phenomenology'; whereas Husserl had once remarked that he had 'forgotten about history,' Heidegger never did. [192] ...

"[H]istorical ontology ... [is] almost synonymous with genealogy. This notion of historical ontology is at work in Heidegger's readings of technology, the housing crisis in postwar Germany, the polis in the early 1940s, and other later concerns. All of these are oriented as critiques of the present. Indeed, in Being and Time, Heidegger talks of the 'ontological task of constructing a non-deductive genealogy of the different possible ways of being.' ...

"In Foucault's understanding of archaeology, for an énoncé to be accepted within a discipline — even before it can be pronounced true or false — it must 'fulfill complex and serious demands'; it must be, in Canguilhem's phrase, 'within the true.' [196] ...

"Though geneaology is sometimes seen as a replacement for archaeology, it is better to see the two as existing together, as two halves of a complementary approach. Archaeology looks at truth as 'a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of énoncés,' while genealogy sees truth as 'linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it.' [198] ...

"Genealogy was for Nietzche a critical history; it was untimely in the sense that it was 'acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come.' ... Nietzshe's critical history became for Heidegger a critique of the present, a critique that was historicized in Heidegger's later works. For Foucault it becomes a history of the present. [199] ...

"Discipline and Punish is, as Foucault says, 'a genealogy of the modern 'soul.' Likewise, The History of Sexuality is not simply an examination of sexuality and subjectivity, but a genealogy of the subject precisely in order to circumvent these notions. All of these works of genealogy can be read as historical ontologies ... framed as histories of the present. Noting how Foucault's connaissance/savoir distinction parallels Heidegger's ontic/ontological difference allows us to see both the continuity between archaeology and genealogy and the continuity between two of the twentieth century's foremost thinkers. [202]" - Elden 2003


2005
"[T]he reassertion of space within social theory can neither be at the expense of time, nor allow space to be assimilated into an otherwise unproblematised historical method (Elden, 2001a [2001]; for a related argument see Lefebvre, 2004)." - Elden 2005a: 821


2010
"[ANT] case studies that do examine politics and inequality do so by drawing upon theoretical languages beyond that of actors and networks. [587] ...

"Couldn’t ANT, in its own way, become a networked 'critical urban theory' (Brenner 2009)? Couldn't ANT provide a decentered-but-still-critical urban sociology of associations, with a lot of interesting case studies? It seems unlikely. If there is anything left to Horkheimer's idea that critical inquiry means getting to 'the human bottom of nonhuman things' (Horkheimer 1972, p. 143), then a critical ANT — call it CANT — is impossible and mutually unwanted. Some actor-network theory can help urbanists critically rethink the nature of urban phenomena ... . But with too much ANT, critical urban studies would be impossible. [588]" - Madden 2010


2012
"Assemblage thinking entails finding explanations in thick empirical descriptions of how ... multiple relations are aligned across differences and actualised. It situates the social and the material in the same ontological frame, but that does not mean that materialities always function politically in the same way or have the same performative force over time or between groups, nor does it assume in advance that the 'social' or the 'material' are likely to have more impact in particular contexts — these are empirical questions. ...

"[I]n focusing on how urban processes are made concrete, lived and contested in everyday practice, assemblage lingers with the possibility of what can be understood by paying close attention to what happens at particular urban sites, before skipping over to pre-given analytical frames that might encapsulate something 'bigger'. Close examination of particular sites helps us to make sense of how urban life operates through practices of routine, disruption, violence, demolition, breakdown, improvisation, coping and uncertainty in the assembling and disassembling of the everyday." - McFarlane 2011b: 381


2013
"[G]enealogy at its best involves a practice of critique in the form of the historical problematization of the present." - Koopman 2013: 2

governance

2004
"One of the essential characteristics of totalitarian regimes in Communist Europe was their persistent effort to stimulate mutual distrust among citizens. Inducement of uncertainty and of distrust in communication, and the propagation of fear, helped to maintain the stability of the regime." - Marková 2004: 9


2004
"The attraction of the concept of hegemony is supposed to lie in its broadening out of the ways in which political domination is meant to operate — through consent as well as coercion. But the recurrent feature of the political-economy invocation of hegemony is that it lacks any clear sense of how consent is actually secured, or any convincing account of how hegemonic projects are anchored at the level of everyday life, other than implying that this works by 'getting at' people in some way or other. And this is where the second use of Foucault in theories of neoliberalism-as-hegemony comes to the fore. Extending the range of activities that are commodified, commercialized and marketized necessarily implies that subjectivities have to be re-fitted as active consumers, entrepreneurial subjects, participants, and so on. Accordingly, the notion of 'governmentality' is appealed to in order to explain how broad macro-structural shifts from state regulation to market regulation are modulated with the micro-contexts of everyday routines. [9] ...

"The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism — whether neo-Marxist and [sic] Foucauldian — comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives 'take' in everyday situations. So perhaps the best thing to do is to stop thinking of 'neoliberalism' as a coherent 'hegemonic' project altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of 'neoliberalism' and 'neoliberalization' in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors 'out there', who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation. The conceptualization of 'neoliberalism' as a 'hegemonic' project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of 'neoliberalism' altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about 'neoliberalism' manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule ... [and] pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. [11]" - Barnett 2005


2007
"Soviet Communism and 'real socialism' [— [d]ubbed by Althusser a 'posthumous revenge of the Second International' — gave rise to debates over] Stalinist economic determinism; post-Stalinist Marxism gradually shifting towards the management of the status quo and torn between what were at times the two antagonistic spheres of interest of the 'socialist camp' and the 'international Communist movement'. The most interesting thing here would be to analyse the extreme tension running through this ideology (which to a large degree doubtless explains its attraction), between a project of resistance to capitalist modernization (if not indeed of a return to the communal modes of life that modernization destroys), and a project of ultra-modernity, or of the supersession of modernity by a 'leap forward' into the future of humanity (not just 'electrification plus soviets', as Lenin's slogan of 1920 had it, but the utopia of the 'new man' and the exploration of the cosmos)." - Balibar 2007: 87


2009
"All reality is political, but not all politics is human." - Harmon 2009: 89


2010
"How would political responses to public problems change were we to take seriously the vitality of (nonhuman) bodies? By 'vitality' I mean the capacity of things — edibles, commodities, storms, metals — not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own. My aspiration is to articulate a vibrant materiality that runs alongside and inside humans to see how analyses of political events might change if we gave the force of things more due." - Bennett 2010: viii